Anti-Forensics

Considering a career in Computer Forensics?

Don't quit your day job......

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Vice President
Secure Computing



What We Will Cover


Encryption

- Plausible Deniability
- Windows Vista
- Steganography Use and Detection
- Hiding Collections of Pictures
- Disk Wiping The Tools Are Getting Scarily Good
- What Good are Known Good/Bad Signatures
- MetaSploit
 - Slacker Hide tons of data encrypted in slack
 - Timestomp So much for MAC
 - Transmorgify One Click Defense
 - Samjuicer No More DLL Injection
- Advanced Anti-Forensics Everything Happens in RAM
- Linux Anti-Forensics Hide Where The Tools Don't Look



Encryption is a forensic analysis's nightmare

- A handful of advances PRTK, EFS Tools, Rainbow Tables etc
- It is only a matter of time before the bad guys adopt current technology encryption
- Current offerings provide for multiple levels of "Plausible Deniability"
 - Create a hidden encrypted volume within an encrypted volume
 - Bad guy gives up the password to the first level only
 - Second level remains hidden and looks like random data within the volume (undetectable)






TrueCrypt Is Also Stealthy

- Settings are not stored in the registry
- Uses a "key file" rather then a crypto key
 - Which of the thousands of files on the image did the bad guy use as the key file?
- Improvements to plausible deniability
 - Uses LRW to replace CRW eliminating any possible detection of non random data within an image
- Creates a virtual encrypted disk within a file and mounts it as a disk



Gaining In Popularity

Total Number of Downloads 657,121 Average Downloads per Day 1,135






"Traveler" mode with BartPE





With Out A Trace

- Create an XP bootable CD
- Boot from the CD and create an encrypted environment on the HD
- No trace on the PC






Trusted Platform Module

TPM Chip Version 1.2

- Hardware present in the computer, e.g. a chip on the motherboard
- Securely stores credentials, such as a private key of a machine certificate and is crypto-enabled
 - Effectively, the essence of a smart smartcard
- TPM can be used to request digital signing of code and files and for mutual authentication of devices
- See www.trustedcomputinggroup.org






Full Volume Encryption


Bitlocker™ EVE

- **FVE** strongly encrypts and signs the entire hard drive
 - TPM chip provides key management
 - Can use additional protection factors such as a USB dongle, PIN or password
- Any unauthorised off-line modification to your data or OS is discovered and no access is granted
 - Prevents attacks which use utilities that access the hard drive while Windows is not running and enforces Windows boot process
- Protection against data loss when machine (laptop) has been stolen
- **Essential part of the Secure Startup**
 - Plan data recovery strategy carefully!
- **UK Backdoor Fun**



No Backdoor Effort Needed from MS








Free On The Fly Encryption

- FreOTFE
- TrueCrypt
- Cryptainer LE
- CryptoExpert 2004 Lite
- CompuSec
- E4M Disk Encryption
- Scramdisk Encryption



Steganography

Hiding data in graphic or audio files







Preserves statistics based on frequency counts


 Statistical tests based on frequency counts are unable to detect data within an image






Free Steganography

- S-Tools
- 4t HIT Mail Privacy Lite
- Camouflage










- Automated detection of data within an image
- Works against:
 - Jsteg
 - Jphide
 - Invisible secrets
 - Outguess
 - F5
 - appendixX and Comouflage









\$ stegdetect sovereigntime.jpg sovereigntime.jpg:
 jsteg(***) \$ stegbreak -tj -f wordlist sovereigntime.jpg
 Loaded 1 files... sovereigntime.jpg: jsteg(abc) Processed 1
 files, found 1 embeddings. Time: 1 seconds: Cracks: 1156,
 1156.0 c/s











Reality on USENET

- Processing the one million images with stegdetect results in about 20,000 suspicious images.
- They launched a dictionary attack on the JSteg and JPHide positive images.
 - The dictionary has a size of 1,800,000 words and phrases. The disconcert cluster used to distribute the dictionary attack has a peak performance of roughly 87 GFLOPS.
- However, they have not found a single hidden message.




Old Trick - New Twist

 Instead of hiding a malicious exe within a picture how about hiding pictures within an encrypted exe





Evidence Eliminator






Evidence Eliminator

- Windows SWAP file
- Windows Application logs
- Windows Temporary Files
- Windows Recycle Bin
- Windows Registry Backups
- Windows Clipboard Data
- Start Menu Recent Documents history
- Start Menu Run history
- Start Menu Find Files History
- Start Menu Find Computer History
- Start Menu Order Data
- Start Menu Click History
- Microsoft Internet Explorer temporary typed URLs, index files, cache and history
- Microsoft Internet Explorer AutoComplete memory of form posts and passwords
- Microsoft Internet Explorer Cookies (Selective cookie keeping for versions 5 and above)
- Microsoft Internet Explorer Internet components (Selective keeping of components)
- Microsoft Internet Explorer Download Folder memory
- Microsoft Internet Explorer Favorites List
- Microsoft Outlook Express v5+ database of (Selective keeping of mail and news groups)
- Windows Media Player History
- Windows Media Player PlayLists in Media Library

- America OnLine Instant Messenger contacts
- Netscape Navigator temporary typed URLs, files, cache and history.
- Netscape Navigator Cookies (Selective cookie keeping for versions 4 and above)
- Netscape Mail v4+ sent and deleted e-mails
- Netscape Mail hidden files
- Customizable lists of files and folders, with or without their contents
- Customizable scan lists of file types in specific folders
- Customizable scan lists of file types on all drives
- Deleted filenames, sizes and attributes from drive directory structures
- Free cluster space ("Slack") from all file tips
- Magnetic remenance from underneath existing files/folders
- All free unallocated space on all hard drives
- Evidence of activity in many other programs, using Plug-In modules
- Slack space and deleted entries in the Windows registry
- Created and modified dates and times on all files and folders
- Windows Registry Streams
- Common Dialog load/save location history
- Instant secure deletes of Windows registry data (NT4/2000/XP)



The Bad Guys Won't Pay For It






Disk Wiping






Wipes Deeper Then Ever






Defeat Forensics For Only \$29.95





PGP hmmmmm



Wiping small files: Wiping small files (under 1 K) on some NTFSformatted disks can leave remnants of the file behind due to an NTFS optimization that stores file data in internal data structures for very small files. These structures are not considered freespace even after deleting a file, and thus they also will not be wiped using PGP Desktop's Freespace Wipe feature. In addition, NTFS supports Journaling, which can save wiped file data in an internal operating system cache. For the highest security wiping on NTFS disks, we recommend starting your system from an OS on a different partition and using PGP Desktop's option in the Freespace Wipe feature to overwrite these NTFS data structures (the Wipe NTFS internal data structures checkbox). This does not affect FAT32 or other supported filesystems. [NBN]




Other Popular Wiping Tools

- srm,
- dban,
- Necrofile,
- Tracks Eraser Pro




- Examining hashes is a quick way to determine if specific files are or are not on the image that is being examined
 - NIST National Software Reference Library (NSRL)
 - Used to be known good now simply known
 - Access Data Has their own and also uses NSRL
 - Encase Small collection but relies on NSRL








 However altering a single byte will alter the hash but still leave a malicious program executable








Unreliable

File MD5 Hash
C:\tiekey.exe FE44F8725BE4C665F8A13DB5788A1793




File MD5 Hash
C:\tiekey.exe 9D8B073866C8F05273B9177629A77B97





- A Packer can change the signature of any exe file and render a search for a known MD5 useless
- The potentially malicious file will not be found with an antivirus scanner





Available Packers

- Alloy 4.14
- Aspack 21
- Cexe NT only
- Diet
- Lzexe 1.00a
- Pack 1.0
- Pecompact 1.20
- Pecompact 1.23
- <u>Petite21</u>

- Petite22
- Pklite32
- Stoner Compress
- Gui for several packers
- UPX101
- wWinlite
- WWpack 3.05b3
- ProTools





- Binders combine two or more executable in to a single executable file
- Allows the bad guy to attach a Trojan, Key logger or other malicious program to a common exe file
- The resulting MD5 will not match a known bad database
- 37 different free binders are downloadable at http://www.trojanfrance.com/index.php?dir=Binders/



Downloadable Binders

Dropper Source Generator 0.1

Attach

Asylum Binder 1.0 by Slim

BigJack Joiner

Binder

Binding Suite

BladeJoiner 1.0 by Blade

BladeJoiner 1.5 by Blade

BladeJoiner 1.55 by Blade

Blade-Bogart Joiner

Blade-Stoner Joiner

Concealer

EliteWrap

Embedder 1.50

Exe Bind 1.0

Exe Maker

FC Binder

GoboWrap 1.0b

Infector 2.0

Infector 9.0

Juntador Beta

MultiBinder

PE-intro adder

Rat Packer

RNS Exe Joiner

SaranWrap

Senna Spy One Exe Maker

Senna Spv One Exe Maker 2000

Senna Spy One Exe Maker 2000 - 2.0a

SilkRope 1.0

SilkRope 1.1

SilkRope 2.0

SilkRope2k

TOP 1.0 by DaRaT

TOP 2.0 by DaRaT

TOP 2.0 beta by DaRaT

TOP 2.1 by DaRaT

TOP 4.0 by DaRaT

TOP GUI by DaRaT

TOP GUI 2 by DaRaT

<u>TrojanMan</u>

WeirdBinder by Weird


X-Exejoiner and Icon changer by Lazarus

Zyon 1.0 multibinder

Sudden Discharge Compresso



Metasploit Anti Forensics





Timestomp

TimeStomp Usage Information: If you mix a lot of options, the behavior is unpredictable. All times should be entered in local time because the utility automatically converts to UTC time. TimeStomp <filename> [options] the name of the file you wish to modify you may need to surround the full path in "" (filename) options: M, set the "last written" time of the file A, set the "last accessed" time of the file -m (date) -a (date) C, set the "created" time of the file E, set the "mft entry modified" time of the file -c (date) -e (date) set all four attributes (MACE) of the file -z (date) (date) "DayofWeek Month\Day\Year HH:MM:SS [AM!PM]" set MACE of <filename> equal to MACE of <src file> -f (src file) time stamps change, but file attributes are unchanged set the MACE timestamps so that EnCase shows blanks same as -b except it works recursively on a directory $-\mathbf{b}$ $-\mathbf{r}$ (aka the Craig option) show the UTC (non-local time) MACE values for (filename) show this menu, help

Metasploit AntiForensics Project

www.metasploit.com/projects/antiforensics/

uses the following Windows system calls:

NtQueryInformationFile()

NtSetInformationFile()

doesn't use

SetFileTime()



Timestomp

```
examples:

1) sets the "last written" attribute of targetfile.txt

TimeStomp targetfile.txt -m "Monday 7/25/2005 5:15:55 AM"

2) sets all four MACE attributes of targetfile.txt

TimeStomp targetfile.txt -z "Saturday 10/08/2005 2:34:56 PM"

3) set the MACE attributes of targetfile.txt equal to srcfile.exe

TimeStomp targetfiletxt -f srcfile.exe

4) set the MACE attributes of targetfile.txt equal to values that EnCase doesn't know how to display

TimeStomp targetfile.txt -b


5) show the MACE attributes of targetfile.txt

TimeStomp targetfile.txt -v
```

Metasploit AntiForensics Project




Timestomp - FTK Unmodified






Timestomp - FTK Modified






Timestomp - Encase Unmodified






Timestomp - Encase Modified






Timestomp - Explorer Unmodified





Timestomp - Explorer Modified





Slacker

```
Hiding a file in slack space:
SLACKER -s <file> <path> <levels> <metadata> [password] [-dxi] [-n¦-k¦-f <xorfil
                                             store a file in slack space
file to be hidden
 (file)
                                            file to be hidden root directory in which to search for slack space depth of subdirectories to search for slack space file containing slack space tracking information passphrase used to encrypt the metadata file dumb, random, or intelligent slack space selection none, random key, or file based data obfusaction the file whose contents will be used as the xor key
 (path)
 (levels)
 (metadata)
[password]
-dxi
 (xorfile)
Restoring a file from slack space:
SLACKER -r <metadata> [password] [-o outfile]
                                             restore a file from slack space
                                             file containing slack space tracking information passphrase used to decrypt the metadata file output file, else original location is used, no clobber
 (metadata)
[password]
 [-o outfile]
C:\metasploit>
```

Metasploit AntiForensics Project



Slacker Example

```
>>To Hide File
D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop>slacker -s test "D:\Documents and Setti
ngs\phenry\Desktop\testfiles" 1 meta.JPG paul -d -n
Mode: store
File: test
Path: D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop\testfiles
Levels: 1
Meta: meta.JPG
Pass: paul
Tech: 1
Hide: 1
File being hidden: test
Filename Tength: 5
File size: 6
Xor Kev: 0
Number of victim files used: 1
File index: 0
Filename: D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop\testfiles\BABY_01.MID
Filename length: 63
Last known file size: 7384
Used sectors: 1
D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop>slacker -s test "D:\Documents and Setti
ngs\phenry\Desktop\testfiles" 1 meta.JPG paul -d -n
>>To Restore File
D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop>slacker -r "D:\Documents and Settings\p
henry\Desktop\meta.JPG" paul -o "D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop\secter
Mode: restore
Meta: D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop\meta.JPG
Out: D:\Documents and Settings\phenry\Desktop\secter
```



Transmogrify – Coming Soon

 Transmogrify - First ever tool to defeat EnCase's file signature capabilities by allowing you to mask and unmask your files as any file type. (Coming Soon)

Metasploit

AntiForensics

Project



Samjuicer

- SAM Juicer does what pwdump does without hitting the disk
 - Pwdump opens a share, drops binaries to the disk and starts a service to inject itself in to LSASS
- Reuses a transport channel that the Metaspoit framework uses, remotely and directly injects itself into the LSASS and sucks down the encrypted password files without leaving a file, touching the registry or starting a service.
 - Not having files or services starting makes protection technologies that rely on that 'signature' to prevent the attack rather impotent.

Metasploit AntiForensics Project



Future Work

- NTFS change journal modification
- Secure deletion
- Documentation of antiforensic techniques
- Browser log manipulation
- File meta-data modification
- NTFS extended attributes

Metasploit
AntiForensics
Project

www.metasploit.com/projects/antiforensics/

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www.stachliu.com



Advanced Anti-Forensics

- What if the malicious file never touched the disk?
- MOSDEF (mose-def) is short for "Most Definitely"
 - MOSDEF is a retargetable, position independent code, C compiler that supports dynamic remote code linking
 - In short, after you've overflowed a process you can compile programs to run inside that process and report back to you
 - www.immunitysec.com/resources-freesoftware.shtml



Linux Anti-Forensics

- Simply hide data where commercial forensic tools don't necessarily look
 - Rune fs
 - Hide data in bad blocks inode
 - Waffen fs
 - Hide data in spoofed journal file
 - KY fs
 - Hide data in null directory entries
 - Data mule fs
 - Hide data in reserved space



Anti-Forensics

In conclusion of our look at Anti-Forensics tools;

The tools freely available on the public Internet for the cyber criminal to cover his/her tracks and to hide data have clearly rendered file systems as no longer being an accurate log of malicious system activity...

Thank You....

Paul A. Henry

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